All reportsRansomware resilience under attack
Ransomware remains one of the most commercially effective forms of cyber attack, not because it is technically sophisticated, but because it consistently encounters environments where basic cyber hygiene has degraded.
This report is therefore not about ransomware as a payload alone. It is about whether security products meaningfully support good cyber hygiene when it matters most, and whether that support holds up across both immediate and deeply embedded attack scenarios.
The answers are found in the detail that follows.
Loading…
Reload document 
Open in new tab 
Ransomware remains one of the most commercially effective forms of cyber attack, not because it is technically sophisticated, but because it consistently encounters environments where basic cyber hygiene has degraded.
Attackers do not need zero-day exploits if patching is inconsistent, privileges are excessive, or protective controls are misconfigured or poorly maintained. In those conditions, ransomware is not an intrusion problem. It is an inevitability.
Ransomware resilience is critical
This report examines ransomware resilience through two complementary attack paths. In the first, ransomware is executed directly, reflecting scenarios where initial access has already been achieved through common vectors such as phishing, exposed services, or credential reuse. In the second, attackers establish a foothold, move laterally, escalate privileges, and only then deploy ransomware, mirroring the more deliberate campaigns now seen in real-world incidents. Both paths are rooted in the same question: what happens when cyber hygiene is stressed rather than assumed?
Security products under pressure
Rather than treating ransomware as a single event, the testing focuses on how effectively security products support day-to-day hygiene under pressure. This includes preventing execution where possible, containing activity when prevention fails, and limiting impact when attackers operate with time and intent. The distinction matters.
Ransomware outcomes are shaped long before encryption begins, often by decisions made months or years earlier about patching discipline, privilege control, and defensive coverage.
The results illustrate why product capability must be evaluated in realistic conditions. A security control that performs well in isolation may behave very differently when faced with chained actions, degraded signals, or attacker persistence. Equally, small implementation weaknesses can compound quickly once an attacker moves beyond the initial breach.
How well does your endpoint security support the organisation?
This report is therefore not about ransomware as a payload alone. It is about whether CrowdStrike Falcon meaningfully support good cyber hygiene when it matters most, and whether that support holds up across both immediate and deeply embedded attack scenarios.
The answers are found in the detail that follows.
