
# HSE Labs INTELLIGENCE-LED TESTING





SE Labs ® tested **Acronis Cyber Protect Cloud with Advanced Security pack + EDR** against a range of hacking attacks designed to compromise systems and penetrate target networks in the same way as criminals and other attackers breach systems and networks.

Full chains of attack were used, meaning that testers behaved as real attackers, probing targets using a variety of tools, techniques and vectors before attempting to gain lower-level and more powerful access. Finally, the testers/ attackers attempted to complete their missions, which might include stealing information, damaging systems and connecting to other systems on the network.

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SE Labs is ISO/IEC 27001 : 2013 certified and BS EN ISO 9001 : 2015 certified for The Provision of IT Security Product Testing.

SE Labs is a member of the Microsoft Virus Initiative (MVI); the Anti-Malware Testing Standards Organization (AMTSO); the Association of anti Virus Asia Researchers (AVAR); and NetSecOPEN.

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Document version 1.0 Written 28th May 2024



#### Introduction

# Endpoint Detection and Response is more than anti-virus

### Understand cybersecurity testing with visible threat intelligence

An Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) product is more than anti-virus, which is why it requires advanced testing. This means testers must behave like real attackers, following every step of an attack.

While it's tempting to save time by taking shortcuts, a tester must go through an entire attack to truly understand the capabilities of EDR security products.

Each step of the attack must be realistic too. You can't just make up what you think bad guys are doing and hope you're right. This is why SE Labs tracks cybercriminal behaviour and builds tests based on how bad guys try to compromise victims.

The cybersecurity industry is familiar with the concept of the 'attack chain', which is the combination of those attack steps. Fortunately the MITRE organisation has documented each step with its ATT&CK framework. While this doesn't give an exact blueprint for realistic attacks, it does present a general structure that testers, security vendors and customers (you!) can use to run tests and understand test results.

The Enterprise Advanced Security tests that SE Labs runs are based on real attackers' behaviour. This means we can present how we run those attacks using a MITRE ATT&CK-style format.

You can see how ATT&CK lists out the details of each attack, and how we represent the way we tested, in **4. Threat Intelligence**, starting on page 13. This brings two main advantages: you can have confidence that the way we test is realistic and relevant; and you're probably already familiar with this way of illustrating cyber attacks.

If you spot a detail in this report that you don't understand, or would like to discuss, please **contact us**. SE Labs uses current threat intelligence to make our tests as realistic as possible. To learn more about how we test, how we define 'threat intelligence' and how we use it to improve our tests please visit our **website** and follow us on **LinkedIn**.

## **Executive Summary**

SE Labs tested **Acronis Cyber Protect Cloud With Advanced Security Pack + EDR** against targeted attacks based on Scattered Spider,
ATP29 and Lapsus\$.

We examined its abilities to:

- Detect highly targeted attacks.
- Protect against the actions of highly targeted attacks.
- Provide remediation to damage and other risks posed by the threats.
- Handle legitimate applications and other objects.

Legitimate files were used alongside the threats to measure any false positive detections or other sub-optimal interactions.

Acronis Cyber Protect Cloud With Advanced
Security Pack + EDR scored an impressive 100%

Detection Accuracy Rating for detecting every element of the attacks. It detected the delivery and initial executing of all the attacks, whether this be a spear phishing attachment or an attempt to exploit an Internet-facing application.

The product also detected all the subsequent malicious activities in the attack chain, tracking all of the hostile activities that occurred as the attacks progressed.

However, it misclassified several legitimate objects as malicious, bringing its Legitimate Accuracy Rating down to 77%.

Given its Total Accuracy Rating of 88%, the product can be described as very accurate and achieved an AA rating for enterprise advanced security.


| Executive Summary  |                         |                           |                                      |                              |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|--|-------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Product Tested   | Attacks<br>Detected (%) | Detection<br>Accuracy (%) | Legitimate<br>Accuracy<br>Rating (%) | Total Accuracy<br>Rating (%) |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Acronis Cyber Protect Cloud with<br>Advanced Security pack + EDR | 100%                    | 100%                      | 77%                                  | 88%                          |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Green highlighting shows that the product was very accurate, scoring 85% or more for Total Accuracy. Yellow means between 75 and 85, while red is for scores of less than 75%.

For exact percentages, see **2. Total Accuracy Ratings** on page 10.

# **Enterprise Advanced Security Award**

The following product wins the SE Labs award:



Acronis
Cyber Protect Cloud
with Advanced
Security pack + EDR

### 1. How We Tested


Testers can't assume that products will work a certain way, so running a realistic advanced security test means setting up real networks and hacking them in the same way that real adversaries behave.

In the diagram on the right you will see an example network that contains workstations, some basic infrastructure such as file servers and a domain controller, as well as cloud-based email and a malicious command and control (C&C) server, which may be a conventional computer or a service such as Dropbox, Twitter, Slack or something else more imaginative.

As you will see in the **Threat Responses** section on page 7, attackers often jump from one compromised system to another in so-called 'lateral movement'. To allow products to detect this type of behaviour the network needs to be built realistically, with systems available, vulnerable and worth compromising.

It is possible to compromise devices such as enterprise printers and other so-called 'IoT' (internet of things) machines, which is why we've included a representative printer in the diagram.

The techniques that we choose for each test case are largely dictated by the real-world behaviour of online criminals. We observe their tactics and replicate what they do in this test. To see more details about how the specific attackers behaved, and how we copied them, see **Hackers vs. Targets** on page 9 and, for a really detailed drill down on the details, **4. Threat Intelligence** on pages 13 and **Appendix D: Attack Details**.



### **Threat Responses**

# Full Attack Chain: Testing Every Layer of Detection and Protection

Attackers start from a certain point and don't stop until they have either achieved their goal or have reached the end of their resources (which could be a deadline or the limit of their abilities). This means, in a test, the tester needs to begin the attack from a realistic first position, such as sending a phishing email or setting up an infected website, and moving through many of the likely steps leading to actually stealing data or causing some other form of damage to the network.

If the test starts too far into the attack chain, such as executing malware on an endpoint, then many products will be denied opportunities to use the full extent of their protection and detection

abilities. If the test concludes before any 'useful' damage or theft has been achieved, then similarly the product may be denied a chance to demonstrate its abilities in behavioural detection and so on.

#### **Attack Stages**

The illustration (below) shows some typical stages of an attack. In a test each of these should be attempted to determine the security solution's effectiveness. This test's results record detection and protection for each of these stages.

We measure how a product responds to the first stages of the attack with a detection and/or protection rating. Sometimes products allow threats to run but detect them. Other times they might allow the threat to run briefly before neutralising it. Ideally they detect and block the threat before it has a chance to run. Products may delete threats or automatically contain them in a 'quarantine' or other safe holding mechanism for later analysis.

Should the initial attack phase succeed we then measure post-exploitation stages, which are represented by steps two through to seven below. We broadly categorise these stages as: Access (step 2); Action (step 3); Escalation (step 4); and Post-escalation (steps 5-7).

In figure 1. you can see a typical attack running from start to end, through various 'hacking' activities.

This can be classified as a fully successful breach.

#### **Attack Chain Stages**
















Figure 1. A typical attack starts with an initial contact and progresses through various stages, including reconnaissance, stealing data and causing damage.

In figure 2. a product or service has interfered with the attack, allowing it to succeed only as far as stage 3, after which it was detected and neutralised. The attacker was unable to progress through stages 4 and onwards.

It is possible for an attack to run in a different order with, for example, the attacker attempting to connect to other systems without needing to escalate privileges. However, it is common for password theft (see step 5) to occur before using stolen credentials to move further through the network.

It is also possible that attackers will not cause noticeable damage during an attack. It may be that their goal is persistent presence on the systems to monitor for activities, slowly steal information and other more subtle missions.

In figure 3. the attacker has managed to progress as far as stage five. This means that the system has been seriously compromised. The attacker has a high level of access and has stolen passwords. However, attempts to exfiltrate data from the target were blocked, as were attempts to damage the system.

#### **Attack Chain:** How Hackers Progress



Figure 2. This attack was initially successful but only able to progress as far as the reconnaissance phase



Figure 3. A more successful attack manages to steal passwords but wholesale data theft and destruction was blocked.

# DE:CODED

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### Hackers vs. Targets

When testing services against targeted attacks it is important to ensure that the attacks used are relevant. Anyone can run an attack randomly against someone else. It is the security vendor's challenge to identify common attack types and to protect against them. As testers, we need to generate threats that in some way relate to the real world.


All of the attacks used in this test are valid ways to compromise an organisation. Without any security in place, all would succeed in attacking the target. Outcomes would include systems infected with ransomware, remote access to networks and data theft.

But we didn't just sit down and brainstorm how we would attack different companies. Instead we used current threat intelligence to look at what the bad guys have been doing over the last few years and copied them quite closely. This way we can test the services' abilities to handle similar threats to those faced by global governments, financial institutions and national infrastructure.

The graphic on this page shows a summary of the attack groups that inspired the targeted attacks used in this test. If a service was able to detect and protect against these then there's a good chance they are on track to blocking similar attacks in the real world. If they fail, then you might take their bold marketing claims about defeating hackers with a pinch of salt.

For more details about each APT group please see **4. Threat Intelligence** on pages 13.

| Attackers vs. Targets  |        |        |   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|------------------------|--------|--------|---|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Attacker/ APT<br>Group | Method | Target | Details   |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Scattered Spider       |        |        | Financially motivated group most famous for the MGM Resorts International attack.                                       |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| APT29                  | PDF    |        | A common tactic of this group is to embed ransomware inside PDF documents.  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Lapsus\$               | ***    |        | Social engineering for credential harvesting, SIM swapping and destructive behaviour even without deploying ransomware. |  |  |  |  |  |  |



# 2. Total Accuracy Ratings

This test examines the total insight a product has, or can provide, into a specific set of attacking actions. We've divided the attack chain into chunks of one or more related actions. To provide sufficient insight, a product must detect at least one action in each chunk.

If you look at the results tables in **Response Details** on page 12 you'll see that Delivery and Execution are grouped together into one chunk, while Action sits alone. Escalation and Post-Escalation (PE) Action are grouped,

while Lateral Movement and Lateral Action are also grouped.

This means that if the product detects either the threat being delivered or executed, it has coverage for that part of the attack. If it detects the action as well as the escalation of privileges and an action involved in lateral movement then it has what we consider to be complete insight, even if it doesn't detect some parts of some chunks (i.e. Lateral Movement, in this example).

# Total Accuracy Ratings Product Total Accuracy Rating Total Accuracy (%) Award Acronis Cyber Protect Cloud with Advanced Security pack + EDR 945.5 88% AA



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selabs.uk/ar2023

# 3. Response Details

In this test security products are exposed to attacks, which comprise multiple stages. The perfect product will detect all relevant elements of an attack. The term 'relevant' is important, because sometimes detecting one part of an attack means it's not necessary to detect another.

For example, in the table below certain stages of the attack chain have been grouped together. As mentioned in **2. Total Accuracy Ratings**, these groups are as follows:

#### Delivery/ Execution (+10)

If the product detects either the delivery or execution of the initial attack stage then a detection for this stage is recorded.

#### Action (+10)

When the attack performs one or more actions, while remotely controlling the target, the product should detect at least one of those actions.

#### Privilege escalation/action (+10)

As the attack progresses there will likely be an attempt to escalate system privileges and to perform more powerful and insidious actions. If the product can detect either the escalation process itself, or any resulting actions, then a detection is recorded.

#### Lateral movement/action (+10)


The attacker may attempt to use the target as a launching system to other vulnerable systems.

If this attempt is discovered, or any subsequent action, a detection is reported.

The Detection Rating is calculated by adding points for each group in a threat chain that is detected. When at least one detection occurs in a single group, a 'group detection' is recorded and 10 points are awarded. Each test round contains one threat chain, which itself contains four groups (as shown above), meaning that complete visibility of each attack adds 40 points to the total value.

A product that detects the delivery of a threat, but nothing subsequently to that, wins only 10 points, while a product that detects delivery and action, but not privilege escalation or lateral behaviours, is rated at 20 for that test round.

#### **Understanding Detection Groups**



Elements of the attack chain are put into groups. For example, the Delivery and Execution stages of an attack are in the same group. Similarly, we group the Post Escalation stage with the Post Escalation Action (PE Action) stage. When we count detections we look to see at least one detection (tick) in each group. One or two detections in a group is a success.

In this example we have four test cases, which we call 'incidents'. In Incident No. 1 there was a detection recorded for the delivery of the threat and when it was executed. These two results count as one detection. In Incident No. 2 the threat delivery was not detected, but its execution was. This also counts as one detection.

When no detection is registered in any part of a group the result will be a 'miss'. In Incident 1. there was no detection when the attacker performed the 'Action' stage of the attack. This is a miss for the product. In fact, this product only detected two of the four Action stages, which is why the Response Details table shows '2' in the Action column.

| Scatter         | ed Spider |          |           |        |            |           |                     |                   |
|-----------------|-----------|----------|-----------|--------|------------|-----------|---------------------|-------------------|
| Incident<br>No: | Detection | Delivery | Execution | Action | Escalation | PE Action | Lateral<br>Movement | Lateral<br>Action |
| 1               | 1         | 1        | <b>✓</b>  | 1      | <b>/</b>   | 1         | _                   | 1                 |
| 2               | <b>/</b>  | 1        | <b>✓</b>  | 1      | 1          | <b>✓</b>  | <b>/</b>            | 1                 |
| 3               | 1         | 1        | <b>✓</b>  | 1      | /          | <b>✓</b>  | <b>/</b>            | 1                 |
| 4               | 1         | 1        | <b>✓</b>  | 1      | /          | 1         | 1                   | 1                 |
| 5               | 1         | 1        | <b>✓</b>  | 1      | <b>/</b>   | 1         | 1                   | 1                 |
| 6               | 1         | 1        | <b>✓</b>  | 1      | 1          | 1         | _                   | 1                 |
| 7               | N/A       | N/A      | N/A       | N/A    | N/A        | N/A       | N/A                 | N/A               |

| APT29           |           |          |           |        |            |           |                     |                   |
|-----------------|-----------|----------|-----------|--------|------------|-----------|---------------------|-------------------|
| Incident<br>No: | Detection | Delivery | Execution | Action | Escalation | PE Action | Lateral<br>Movement | Lateral<br>Action |
| 8               | 1         | 1        | <b>√</b>  | 1      | 1          | <b>✓</b>  | <b>/</b>            | 1                 |
| 9               | 1         | 1        | 1         | 1      | 1          | 1         |                     | 1                 |
| 10              | 1         | 1        | 1         | 1      | 1          | 1         |                     | 1                 |
| 11              | 1         | 1        | 1         | 1      | 1          | <b>√</b>  |                     | 1                 |
| 12              | 1         | 1        | <b>✓</b>  | 1      | 1          | 1         | <b>/</b>            | 1                 |
| 13              | N/A       | N/A      | N/A       | N/A    | N/A        | N/A       | N/A                 | N/A               |

| Lapsus          | ;         |          |           |          |            |           |                     |                   |
|-----------------|-----------|----------|-----------|----------|------------|-----------|---------------------|-------------------|
| Incident<br>No: | Detection | Delivery | Execution | Action   | Escalation | PE Action | Lateral<br>Movement | Lateral<br>Action |
| 14              | 1         | 1        | <b>✓</b>  | 1        | 1          | _         | _                   | 1                 |
| 15              | <b>✓</b>  | <b>√</b> | <b>✓</b>  | <b>✓</b> | <b>/</b>   | _         | _                   | <b>√</b>          |

#### **Group Detections**

We record detections in groups, as described above in Understanding Detection Groups. To get an overview of how a product handled the entire set of threats we then combine these detections into 'Group Detections'.

In a test with four incidents and four detection groups (Delivery/Execution; Action; Escalation/ PE Action; and Lateral Movement/ Lateral Action) the maximum score would be 16. This is because for each of the four threats a product that detects everything would score 4.

Our overall Detection Rating is based on the number of Detection Groups achieved.

| Response Detail        | Response Details       |                     |                        |        |                                    |                                |  |  |  |  |
|------------------------|------------------------|---------------------|------------------------|--------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------|--|--|--|--|
| Attacker/<br>APT Group | Number of<br>Incidents | Attacks<br>Detected | Delivery/<br>Execution | Action | Privilege<br>Escalation/<br>Action | Lateral<br>Movement/<br>Action |  |  |  |  |
| Scattered Spider       | 6                      | 6                   | 6                      | 6      | 6                                  | 6                              |  |  |  |  |
| APT29                  | 5                      | 5                   | 5                      | 5      | 5                                  | 5                              |  |  |  |  |
| Lapsus\$               | 2                      | 2                   | 2                      | 2      | 2                                  | 2                              |  |  |  |  |
| Total                  | 13                     | 13                  | 13                     | 13     | 13                                 | 13                             |  |  |  |  |

This data shows how the product handled different group stages of each APT. The Detection column shows the basic level of detection.

| Detection Accuracy Rating Details |                        |                     |                     |                     |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Attacker/<br>APT Group            | Number of<br>Incidents | Attacks<br>Detected | Group<br>Detections | Detection<br>Rating |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Scattered Spider                  | 6                      | 6                   | 24                  | 240                 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| APT29                             | 5                      | 5                   | 20                  | 200                 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Lapsus\$                          | 2                      | 2                   | 8                   | 80                  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total                             | 13                     | 13                  | 52                  | 520                 |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Different levels of detection, and failure to detect, are used to calculate the Detection Rating.

| Detection Accuracy Ratings                                       |                              |                                  |  |  |  |  |  |
|--|------------------------------|----------------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|
| Product  | Detection Accuracy<br>Rating | Detection Accuracy<br>Rating (%) |  |  |  |  |  |
| Acronis Cyber Protect Cloud with<br>Advanced Security pack + EDR | 520                          | 100%                             |  |  |  |  |  |



Detection Ratings are weighted to show that how products detect threats can be subtler than just 'win' or 'lose'.


# 4. Threat Intelligence

### **Scattered Spider**

The Scattered Spider group has been active since at least 2022 and focussed on targets that provided customer relationship and business process solutions. It also attacks telecommunication and high-tech businesses.

#### Reference:

https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1015/




| Example Scattered Sp              | Example Scattered Spider Attack |                              |                             |                                   |                  |                               |  |                                |  |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------|-------------------------------|--|--------------------------------|--|
| Delivery                          | Execution                       | Action                       | Privilege Escalation        | Post-Escalation Action            | Lateral Movement | Lateral Action                |  |                                |  |
|                                   | Malicious Link                  | System Information Discovery |                             | Hide Artifacts                    |                  | Intial File Transfer          |  |                                |  |
|                                   | Web Protocols                   | File and Directory Discovery |                             | Disable or Modify System Firewall |                  | Input Capture                 |  |                                |  |
|                                   |                                 | Process Discovery            |                             | Scheduled Task/Job                |                  | Clipboard Data                |  |                                |  |
| Exploit Public-Facing Application |                                 | Query Registry               | Bypass User Account Control | LSASS Memory                      | SSH              | Email Collection              |  |                                |  |
|                                   | Windows Command Shell           | Remote System Discovery      |                             | Cloud Infrastructure Discovery    |                  | Data from Local System        |  |                                |  |
|                                   |                                 | Network Share Discovery      |                             |                                   |                  | Cloud Service Discovery       |  | Data from Cloud Storage Object |  |
|                                   |                                 | Network Service Discovery    |                             | Sharepoint                        |                  | Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |  |                                |  |
| Exploit Public-Facing Application | Web Protocols                   | System Information Discovery | Bypass User Account Control | LSASS Memory                      | ><br>SSH         | Data from Local System        |  |                                |  |

#### APT29

Thought to be connected with Russian military cyber operations, APT29 targets government, military and telecommunications sectors. It is believed to have been behind the Democratic National Committee hack in 2015, in which it used phishing emails with attached malware or links to malicious scripts.

#### Reference:

https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016/




| Example APT29 Attac      | :k                          |                              |                             |                               |                          |   |                     |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------|---|---------------------|
| Delivery                 | Execution                   | Action                       | Privilege Escalation        | Post-Escalation Action        | Lateral Movement         | Lateral Action  |                     |
|                          | Powershell                  | Cloud Account                |                             | Pass the Ticket               |                          | Exfiltration Over Asymmetric<br>Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol |                     |
|                          | Malicious File              | Domain Account               |                             | Local Accounts                |                          | Archive via Utility                                       |                     |
| Spearphishing Attachment | Internal Proxy              | Domain Groups                | Bypass User Account Control | Disable Windows Event Logging | SMB/Windows Admin Shares | Code Repositories   |                     |
|                          | Bidirectional Communication | File and Directory Discovery |                             |                               | Disable or Modify Tools  |   | Remote Data Staging |
|                          |                             |                              |                             | DCSync                        |                          | Remote Email Collection                                   |                     |
|                          | Encrypted Channel           | Domain Trust Discovery       |                             | File Deletion                 |                          |   |                     |
| Spearphishing Attachment | Malicious File              | Domain Groups                | Bypass User Account Control | File Deletion                 | SMB/Windows Admin Shares | Remote Email Collection                                   |                     |

### Lapsus\$

Relying largely on social engineering to begin its attacks, Lapsus\$ has operated since mid-2021. Its approach often needs destructive attacks to extort ransoms from victims, although without using ransomware.

#### Reference:

https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1004/




| Example Lapsus\$ At  | tack                            |                              |                                       |                               |                          |   |  |   |  |  |
|----------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------|---|--|---|--|--|
| Delivery             | Execution                       | Action                       | Privilege Escalation                  | Post-Escalation Action        | Lateral Movement         | Lateral Action                          |  |   |  |  |
| Spearphishing Link   | User Execution                  | File and Directory Discovery |                                       | Credentials from Web Browsers |                          | Sharepoint                              |  |   |  |  |
| Trusted Relationship |                                 | Process Discovery            |                                       | Password Managers             |                          | Data from Information Repositories      |  |   |  |  |
|                      |                                 | Domain Groups                |                                       | DCSync                        |                          | Confluence                              |  |   |  |  |
|                      |                                 |                              | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | NTDS                          | External Remote Services | Chat Messages                           |  |   |  |  |
| Deput                | Malicious File  Domain Accounts |                              |                                       | Cloud Accounts                |                          | Email Forwarding Rule                   |  |   |  |  |
| Proxy                |                                 |                              |                                       | Domain Accounts               |                          | Create Cloud Instance                   |  | Account Access Removal Data Destruction |  |  |
|                      |                                 | Delete Cloud Instance        |                                       |                               |                          |   |  |   |  |  |
|                      |                                 |                              |                                       | Additional Cloud Roles        |                          | Service Stop                            |  |   |  |  |
| 61                   |                                 |                              |                                       | ***                           | <u>\$</u>                |   |  |   |  |  |
| Spearphishing Link   | Malicious File                  | Domain Groups                | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | Credentials from Web Browsers | External Remote Services | Account Access Removal Data Destruction |  |   |  |  |

# 5. Legitimate Software Rating

These ratings indicate how accurately the product classifies legitimate applications and URLs, while also taking into account the interactions that the product has with the user. Ideally a product will either not classify a legitimate object or will classify it as safe. In neither case should it bother the user.

We also take into account the prevalence (popularity) of the applications and websites used in this part of the test, applying stricter penalties for when products misclassify very popular software and sites.

| Legitimate Software Ratings                                      |       |     |  |  |  |  |
|--|-------|-----|--|--|--|--|
| Product Legitimate Accuracy Rating Legitimate Accuracy (%)       |       |     |  |  |  |  |
| Acronis Cyber Protect Cloud with<br>Advanced Security pack + EDR | 425.5 | 77% |  |  |  |  |



Legitimate Software Ratings can indicate how well a vendor has tuned its detection engine.

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### 6. Conclusions

The test exposed Acronis Cyber Protect Cloud with Advanced Security pack + EDR to a diverse set of exploits, file-less attacks and malware attachments, comprising the widest range of threats in any currently available public test.

All of these attack types have been witnessed in real-world attacks over the previous few years. They are representative of a real and present threat to business networks the world over.

The threats used in this are similar or identical to those used by the threat groups listed in **Hackers vs. Targets** on page 9 and **4. Threat Intelligence** on pages 13-16. Scattered Spider and Lapsus\$ are threat groups that have emerged fairly recently compared to APT29 which was first observed in 2008. However, APT29 has remained active since then and has been developing new attack techniques.

It is important to note that while the test used the same type of attacks, new files were used. This exercised the tested product's abilities to detect and protect against certain approaches to attacking systems rather than simply detecting malicious files that have become well-known over the previous few years. The results are an indicator of future performance rather than just a compliance check that the product can detect old attacks.

Acronis Cyber Protect Cloud with Advanced
Security pack + EDR detected almost all of the

threats on a basic level, in that for each attack it detected at least some element of the attack chain. It was not tested against Linux-based rounds 7 and 13 because the product was not configured with a Linux sensor.

The product detected all the other threats in depth, capturing details as each threat proceeded down the attack chain from the initial introduction to the system through to executing and subsequent behaviour by the attacker. This ability to detect every element of the attack chain was especially evident when the product was confronted with Scattered Spider-type threats that launched a wide variety of post-escalation actions. Its excellent performance earned it a 100% Detection Accuracy Rating.

Acronis Cyber Protect Cloud with Advanced Security pack + EDR did misclassify several legitimate objects as threats, bringing its Legitimate Accuracy Rating down to 77%. When a product wrongly detects legitimate software, it can hamper operations. Security operatives end up trading convenience for protection as they end up deciding what's malicious or benign.

**Acronis** claims to have fixed this issue with an update.

Given its Total Accuracy Rating of 88%, the product can be described as very accurate and achieved an AA rating for enterprise advanced security.

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# **Appendices Appendix A:** Terms Used

| Term                    | Meaning  |
|-------------------------|--|
| Compromised             | The attack succeeded, resulting in malware running unhindered on the target. In the case of a targeted attack, the attacker was able to take remote control of the system and carry out a variety of tasks without hindrance.  |
| Blocked                 | The attack was prevented from making any changes to the target.  |
| False positive          | When a security product misclassifies a legitimate application or website as being malicious, it generates a 'false positive'.   |
| Neutralised             | The exploit or malware payload ran on the target but was subsequently removed.   |
| Complete<br>Remediation | If a security product removes all significant traces of an attack, it has achieved complete remediation.   |
| Target                  | The test system that is protected by a security product.   |
| Threat                  | A program or sequence of interactions with the target that is designed to take some level of unauthorised control of that target.  |
| Update                  | Security vendors provide information to their products in an effort to keep abreast of the latest threats. These updates may be downloaded in bulk as one or more files, or requested individually and live over the internet. |

### **Appendix B:** FAQs

A full methodology for this test is available from our website.

- The test was conducted between 3rd and 4th April 2024.
- The product was configured according to its vendor's recommendations.
- Targeted attacks were selected and verified by SE Labs.
- Malicious and legitimate data was provided to partner organisations once the test was complete.

# What is a partner organisation? Can I become one to gain access to the threat data used in your tests?

Partner organisations benefit from our consultancy services after a test has been run. Partners may gain access to low-level data that can be useful in product improvement initiatives and have permission to use award logos, where appropriate, for marketing purposes. We do not share data on one partner with other partners. We do not partner with organisations that do not engage in our testing.

We are a customer considering buying or changing our endpoint protection and/or endpoint detection and response (EDR) product. Can you help?

Yes, we frequently run private testing for organisations that are considering changing their security products. Please contact us at **info@selabs.uk** for more information.

### **Appendix C:** Product Versions

The table below shows the service's name as it was being marketed at the time of the test.

| Product Versions |   |                       |                     |  |  |  |
|------------------|---|-----------------------|---------------------|--|--|--|
| Vendor           | Product   | Build Version (start) | Build Version (end) |  |  |  |
| Acronis          | Cyber Protect Cloud with Advanced Security pack + EDR | 23.12 37114           | 24.3.37587          |  |  |  |

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
# Appendix D: Attack Details

| ident No. | Delivery   | Execution   | Action                                  | Privilege Escalation   | Post-Escalation                                       | Lateral Movement               | Lateral Action                |
|-----------|--|---|---|--|---|--------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| ueneno.   | Delivery   | Malicious Link  | System Information Discovery            | 1 HVIICE ESCULUTION  | Hide Artifacts  | Euterat Wovernent              | Intial File Transfer          |
| 1         |  | Web Protocols   | File and Directory Discovery            | _  | Disable or Modify System Firewall                     | _                              | Input Capture                 |
|           |  | Web Flotocots   |   |  | Scheduled Task/Job                                    | _                              | <u> </u>                      |
|           | Free left Dublie Feeter Application  |   | Process Discovery                       | Donas - Harris Assessment Countries  |   | SSH                            | Clipboard Data                |
|           | Exploit Public-Facing Application  | N   | Query Registry                          | Bypass User Account Control  | LSASS Memory  |                                | Email Collection              |
|           |  | Windows Command Shell   | Remote System Discovery                 |  | Cloud Infrastructure Discovery                        |                                | Data from Local System        |
|           |  |   | Network Share Discovery                 |  | Cloud Service Discovery                               |                                | Data from Cloud Storage Obje  |
|           |  |   | Network Service Discovery               |  | Sharepoint  |                                | Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
|           |  | Malicious Link  | System Information Discovery            | Create Process with Token  | Security Software Discovery                           |                                | Email Collection              |
|           |  | Web Protocols   | File and Directory Discovery            |  | Dynamic-link Library Injection                        |                                | Data from Local System        |
| 7         |  | Windows Command Shell   | Process Discovery                       |  | Winlog Helper DLL                                     |                                | Data from Cloud Storage Obje  |
|           | Spearphishing Link   |   | System Network Configuration Discovery  | Token Impersonation/Theft  | Cloud Service Discovery                               | Service Execution              | Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
| _         |  | External Proxy  | System Network Connections Discovery    | - Toker impersonations mere  | Cloud Storage Object Discovery                        |                                | Account Access Removal        |
|           |  | Externations  | Internet Connection Discovery           |  | Browser Extensions                                    |                                | Data Encrypted for Impact     |
|           |  |   | Local Account                           |  | Hide Artifacts  |                                | System Shutdown/Reboot        |
|           |  | Malicious File  | System Information Discovery            |  | Domain Accounts                                       |                                | Account Access Removal        |
|           |  | Web Protocols   | File and Directory Discovery            |  | Local Accounts  |                                | Data Encrypted for Impact     |
|           |  | Windows Command Shell   | Process Discovery                       |  | Cloud Accounts  |                                | System Shutdown/Reboot        |
|           |  | External Proxy  | Local Account                           |  | Disable Cloud Logs                                    |                                | Safe Mode Boot                |
| 7         |  | Non-Standard Port   | Domain Groups                           | 1  | Domain Trust Modification                             |                                | Automatic Collection          |
| 7         | Spearphishing Attachment   |   | Domain Trust Discovery                  | Bypass User Account Control  | Kernel Modules and Extensions                         | SMB/Windows Admin Shares       | Data from Local System        |
| <i></i>   |  |   | Remote System Discovery                 |  | BITS Jobs   |                                | Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
|           |  | Indicator Removal From Tools  | Cloud Account                           |  | DCSync  |                                | Exiteration to close Storage  |
|           |  | malcator removat Form 100ts   | clodd Accoont                           |  | Impair Command History Logging                        |                                | Device Registration           |
|           |  |   | Group Policy Discovery                  |  | LSA Secrets   |                                | Device Registration           |
|           |  | Malicious Link  | System Information Discovery            |  | NTDS  |                                | Innut Cantura                 |
|           |  | Web Protocols   | , | _  |   | _                              | Input Capture Clipboard Data  |
|           |  |   | File and Directory Discovery            |  | Disable or Modify Tools                               | SMB/Windows Admin Shares       | - 1                           |
| 1.        |  | Windows Command Shell   | Process Discovery                       | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation  | Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder                    |                                | Email Collection              |
| 4         | Exploit Public-Facing Application  | External Proxy  | Remote System Discovery                 |  | Azure Account Creation                                |                                | Data from Local System        |
| 1         |  | Non-Standard Port   | Cloud Account                           |  | Match Legitimate Name or Location                     |                                | Automatic Collection          |
|           |  | Compromise Software Supply Chain  | Network Service Discovery               |  | Rename System Utilities                               |                                | Data from Cloud Storage Obje  |
|           |  | compromise sortware supply chair  | Query Registry                          |  | Modify Authentication Process                         |                                | Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
|           |  | Windows Command Shell   | File and Directory Discovery            |  | Create Cloud Instance                                 | Windows Remote Management      | Data from Cloud Storage Obje  |
|           |  | External Proxy  | System Information Discovery            | Sharepoint   |   | Exfiltration to Cloud Storage  |                               |
|           |  | Non-Standard Port   | System Owner/User Discovery             |  | Code Repositories                                     |                                | Data from Local System        |
|           |  | Indicator Removal From Tools  | Network Share Discovery                 |  | Portable Executable Injection                         |                                | Account Access Removal        |
|           | Construction of Additional Additi | Trusted Relationship  | Process Discovery                       | Access Token Manipulation  |   | Data Encrypted for Impact      |                               |
| ט         | Spearphishing Attachment   |   | Query Registry                          |  | Web Session Cookie                                    | Initial File Transfer          | Input Capture                 |
| <b>-</b>  |  | Compromise Software Supply Chain  | Domain Account                          | 1  | Cloud Instance Metadata API                           |                                | Automatic Collection          |
|           |  |   | Internet Connection Discovery           | 1  | Credentials In Files                                  |                                |                               |
|           |  |   | Domain Groups                           | External Remote Services   |   |                                | System Shutdown/Reboot        |
|           |  |   | Cloud Account                           |  |   | System Shotdown Resour         |                               |
|           |  | Malicious File  | File and Directory Discovery            | Domain Trust Modification  | Native API  | Remote Access Software         | Input Capture                 |
|           |  | Web Protocols   | System Information Discovery            | Domain nost wodincation  | Cloud Infrastructure Discovery                        | Protocol Tunneling             | Clipboard Data                |
|           |  | Windows Command Shell   | System Owner/User Discovery             |  | Cloud Service Discovery                               |                                | Automatic Collection          |
|           |  |   |   | _  | Cloud Storage Object Discovery                        |                                | Data from Cloud Storage Obje  |
|           |  | External Proxy  | Domain Account                          | _  |   |                                |                               |
|           |  | Non-Standard Port   | Internet Connection Discovery           |  | Credentials from Password Stores                      |                                | Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
| $\subset$ |  | Indicator Removal From Tools  Domain Groups Cloud Account Process Discovery Query Registry Permission Groups Discovery  Domain Trust Modification | ·                                       |  | Multi-Factor Authentication Interception              |                                | Account Access Removal        |
| 6         | Exploit Public-Facing Application  |   |   | Bypass User Account Control  | Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation        |                                | Data Encrypted for Impact     |
| 0         |  |   | -                                       | Bypuss oser Account Control  | Default Accounts                                      |                                | System Shutdown/Reboot        |
|           |  |   |   |  | Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription |                                |                               |
|           |  |   | Permission Groups Discovery             |  | Modify Authentication Process                         |                                |                               |
|           |  |   |   |  | Disable or Modify Tools                               |                                | Safe Mode Boot                |
|           |  |   | Domain Trust Modification               |  | Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder                    |                                |                               |
|           |  |   |   |  | Azure Account Creation                                |                                |                               |
|           |  | Malicious Link  | File and Directory Discovery            |  | Binary Padding  |                                | Input Capture                 |
| _,        |  | Web Protocols   | System Information Discovery            |  | File Deletion   |                                | Clipboard Data                |
| 7         | Spearphishing Link   |   | System Owner/User Discovery             | A CONTRACTOR OF THE PARTY OF TH |   | External Remote Services / SSH | Email Collection              |
|           |  | Non-Standard Port Internet Connection Discovery   |   | Match Legitimate name or Location  | Externat Remote Services / 33H                        | Data from Local System         |                               |
|           |  |   | Internet Connection Discovery           |  | materize gitimate name of Location                    |                                |                               |

| APT29        |                                   |                                    |                               |                                       |   |                           |  |
|--------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---|---------------------------|--|
| Incident No. | Delivery                          | Execution                          | Action                        | Privilege Escalation                  | Post-Escalation                                       | Lateral Movement          | Lateral Action   |
| 0            | Exploit Public-Facing Application | Web Protocols                      | Cloud Account                 | Bypass User Account Control           | Application Access Token                              | Cloud Services            | Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
|              |                                   | Steganography                      | Domain Account                | Additional Cloud Credentials          | Pass the Ticket                                       | Remote Desktop Protocol   | Archive via Utility                                    |
|              | External Remote Services          | Malicious File                     | Domain Groups                 |                                       | Web Session Cookie                                    |                           | Code Repositories                                      |
| 8            |                                   | Internal Proxy                     | Internet Connection Discovery | Additional Cloud Roles                | Cloud Accounts  |                           | Remote Data Staging                                    |
|              |                                   | Mark-of-the-Web Bypass             | File and Directory Discovery  | Additional Cloud Roles                | Local Accounts  |                           | Remote Email Collection                                |
|              |                                   | Multi-hop Proxy                    | Domain Trust Discovery        |                                       | Domain Accounts                                       |                           |  |
|              | Trusted Relationship              | Bidirectional Communication        | File and Directory Discovery  | Device Registration                   | Application Access Token                              |                           | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information                |
|              |                                   | Dynamic Resolution                 | Process Discovery             |                                       | Domain Trust Modification                             |                           | Archive via Utility                                    |
|              |                                   | Mshta                              | Remote System Discovery       |                                       | Disable or Modify System Firewall                     |                           | Code Repositories                                      |
| Y            | Spearphishing Attachment          | Software Packing                   | System Information Discovery  | Bypass User Account Control           | Disable or Modify Tools                               | SMB/Windows Admin Shares  | Remote Data Staging                                    |
|              | Spearphishing Attachment          | Code Signing                       | Domain Trust Discovery        | bypass oser Account Control           | Disable Windows Event Logging                         |                           | Remote Email Collection                                |
|              |                                   | Windows Command Shell              | Internet Connection Discovery |                                       | Accessibility Features                                |                           | Data from Local System                                 |
|              |                                   | Malicious File                     | Cloud Account                 |                                       | Clear Mailbox Data                                    |                           |  |
|              |                                   | Encrypted Channel                  | File and Directory Discovery  | Ingress Tool Transfer                 | File Deletion   | Cloud Services            | Archive via Utility                                    |
|              |                                   | Rundll32                           | Process Discovery             |                                       | Timestomp   |                           | Code Repositories                                      |
| 10           | Spearphishing Attachment          | HTML Smuggling                     | Remote System Discovery       |                                       | Masquerade Task or Service                            | Windows Remote Management | Remote Data Staging                                    |
| l IU         | Spearphishing Attachment          | Cloud API                          | System Information Discovery  | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | Match Legitimate Name or Location                     |                           | Remote Email Collection                                |
|              |                                   | Visual Basic                       | Domain Trust Discovery        |                                       | Hybrid Identity                                       |                           | Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
|              |                                   | Malicious File                     | Domain Groups                 |                                       | Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription |                           | Exhitiation over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol  |
|              | Spearphishing via Service         | Malicious File                     | File and Directory Discovery  |                                       | Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder                    | Cloud Services            | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information                |
|              | Compromise Software Supply Chain  | Domain Fronting                    | Process Discovery             | Bypass User Account Control           | Disable or Modify System Firewall                     | Remote Desktop Protocol   | Archive via Utility                                    |
| 77           |                                   | Python                             | Remote System Discovery       |                                       | Scheduled Task  |                           | Code Repositories                                      |
|              |                                   | Cloud Administration Command       | System Information Discovery  |                                       | External Remote Services                              |                           |  |
| ''           |                                   | Exploitation for Client Execution  | Domain Account                |                                       | Additional Email Delegate Permissions                 |                           | Data from Local System                                 |
|              |                                   | Windows Management Instrumentation | Cloud Account                 |                                       | Device Registration                                   |                           | Butu Holli Edeut System                                |
|              |                                   | Windows Management Instrumentation | Cloud Account                 |                                       | Timestomp   |                           |  |
|              | Spearphishing Attachment          | Powershell                         | Cloud Account                 | Bypass User Account Control           | Pass the Ticket                                       | SMB/Windows Admin Shares  | Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
|              |                                   | Malicious File                     | Domain Account                |                                       | Local Accounts  |                           | Archive via Utility                                    |
| 17           |                                   | Internal Proxy                     | Domain Groups                 |                                       | Disable Windows Event Logging                         |                           | Code Repositories                                      |
| _            | Spearprishing / teachinent        | Bidirectional Communication        | File and Directory Discovery  |                                       | Disable or Modify Tools                               |                           | Remote Data Staging                                    |
|              |                                   | Encrypted Channel                  | Domain Trust Discovery        |                                       | DCSync  |                           | Remote Email Collection                                |
|              |                                   | Enerypted enarmet                  | Bornair Trost Biscovery       |                                       | File Deletion   |                           | Nemote Email Collection                                |
|              | Spearphishing Link                | Web Protocols                      | Internet Connection Discovery |                                       | Binary Padding  | Remote Desktop Protocol   | Archive via Utility                                    |
| 10           |                                   | Domain Fronting                    | File and Directory Discovery  |                                       |   |                           | Code Repositories                                      |
|              |                                   | Internal Proxy                     | Process Discovery             |                                       | RC Scripts  |                           | Data from Local System                                 |
|              |                                   | Software Packing                   | System Information Discovery  |                                       | ine scripts   |                           |  |
|              |                                   | Malicious Link                     | z,z.cm.mom.ucion biscovery    |                                       |   |                           |  |

| Lapsus\$     |                          |                |                              |                                       |                               |                          |   |  |
|--------------|--------------------------|----------------|------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------------|---|--|
| Incident No. | Delivery                 | Execution      | Action                       | Privilege Escalation                  | Post-Escalation               | Lateral Movement         | Lateral Action                          |  |
|              | Spearphishing Attachment | User Execution | File and Directory Discovery |                                       | Credentials from Web Browsers |                          | Sharepoint                              |  |
|              | Trusted Relationship     |                | Process Discovery            |                                       | Password Managers             | External Remote Services | Data from Information Repositories      |  |
|              |                          |                | Domain Groups                |                                       | DCSync                        |                          | Confluence                              |  |
| 1 /.         |                          |                |                              | Fundaitation for Privilege Facelation | NTDS                          |                          | Chat Messages                           |  |
| 14           | Proxy                    | Malicious File |                              | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | Cloud Accounts                |                          | Email Forwarding Rule                   |  |
|              |                          |                | Domain Accounts              |                                       | Create Cloud Instance         |                          | Account Access Removal Data Destruction |  |
|              |                          |                |                              |                                       | Delete Cloud Instance         |                          | Comittee Chara                          |  |
|              |                          |                |                              |                                       | Additional Cloud Roles        |                          | Service Stop                            |  |
|              | Spearphishing Link       | User Execution | File and Directory Discovery |                                       | Credentials from Web Browsers | External Remote Services | Sharepoint                              |  |
|              | Trusted Relationship     |                | Process Discovery            |                                       | Password Managers             |                          | Data from Information Repositories      |  |
|              | Proxy                    |                | Domain Groups                |                                       | DCSync                        |                          | Confluence                              |  |
| 1 1 [        |                          |                |                              | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | NTDS                          |                          | Chat Messages                           |  |
| 15           |                          | Malicious File |                              | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | Cloud Accounts                |                          | Email Forwarding Rule                   |  |
|              |                          |                | Domain Accounts              |                                       | Create Cloud Instance         |                          | Account Access Removal Data Destruction |  |
|              |                          |                |                              |                                       | Delete Cloud Instance         |                          | Camilas Stan                            |  |
|              |                          |                |                              |                                       | Additional Cloud Roles        |                          | Service Stop                            |  |

Techniques in grey are either normally tested within test cases 7 and 13 or are cloud techniques. The product did not have coverage for cloud and Linux techniques, which is why these test cases and techniques were not covered or scored in this run.



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